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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 970038-CA

TOMMY GLEN CARTER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft from a person,
a second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

In moving for a continuance, did defendant demonstrate

that the testimony of the absent witness was both material and
admissible and that he had exercised due diligence in preparing
for the case prior to requesting the continuance?
Whether a continuance should be granted or denied is within
I
the sound discretion of the trial court. On appeal, such a
decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion.

State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982);

State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App. 1993).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
References to constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
are unnecessary to the disposition of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of theft from a person,
a second degree felony, for taking money from the person of
Joshua Irvin on a downtown Salt Lake City street on June 27, 1996
(R. 3-4). He was tried before a jury, convicted as charged, and
sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison, with credit for
time served.

He was also ordered to pay a $500 recoupment fee to

the Legal Defender Association and restitution of $13 to the
victim, jointly and severally with his co-defendant (R. 109-10).
Defendant subsequently filed this timely appeal (R. Ill, 113).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
1992).

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah

Joshua Irvin, the victim in this case, alighted from a

bus in downtown Salt Lake, intending to buy a soda before
transferring to another bus that would take him home (R. 121, p.
3-4).l

To that end, he separated the money in his pocket,

putting a ten dollar bill and a few one dollar bills in his left

1

The trial transcript as it appears in the record on
appeal compresses six pages of trial transcript into one page of
appellate record. To enhance the precision of its citations, the
State uses "R" to denote the appellate record citation and "p" to
refer to the transcript page within the record citation.
2

front pocket and the loose change in his right front pocket (Id,
at p. 5). As he was walking towards a nearby Circle K store, he
felt a bump "on the right side from behind by someone" (Id. at
p.6).

The bump, which was hard enough to stop him, prompted him

to turn towards the individual, either to apologize or to get out
of the way (Id.).

At that juncture, he stated, "I felt a tug on

my pants, turned around and saw that my [left] pocket was being
got into" by a second individual (R. 122 at p. 7).
Irvin, both surprised and frightened by these events, yelled
something at the two intruders, who trotted away, smiling, in no
apparent rush (Id. at pp. 9-10).

Defendant shouted back at Irvin

something like, "If I had a violin, I'd play it for you right
now" (Id. at p. 10). Reluctant to go after the two by himself,
Irvin at first decided just to forget the whole incident.

On

further reflection, however, he realized that he had been
victimized and didn't want "to just lay down and let it happen"
(Id. at p. 11).
Irvin went to a nearby Travelodge and called 911, describing
to the police what the two individuals were wearing (Id. at p.
11-12).

While waiting for the police, Irvin felt "antsy,"

wondering where the two had gone.

He went outside the Travelodge

and spotted them sitting at the bus station on the grass.
Shortly thereafter, two officers on bicycles arrived at the
Travelodge (R. 123, p. 14). Irvin described the two men and

3

pointed them out to the officers, who rode their bikes over to
the bus station, where defendant and his companion, Kenneth
Ellis, were arrested (R. 130, p. 156; R. 133, p. 73). The
arresting officer searched defendant and found a ten dollar bill
in his pocket (R. 133, p. 73). 2
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Joshua Irvin, both
officers who responded to Irvin's 911 call, a robbery detective,
defendant, Kenneth Ellis, and the Circle K clerk who was on duty
that afternoon.
The morning after both sides rested, counsel for Kenneth
Ellis moved for a continuance.

Ellis's counsel stated that Brian

Meek, a jail inmate, had told Ellis that he knew someone named
Joshua Irvin who used crystal methamphetamine (R. 165, p. 2 or
addendum A).

Acting on instructions from the court, Ellis's

counsel spoke with Meek and then reported the following
information back to the court:
[Brian Meek] indicated to me that he went to
a school [sic] with someone by the name of
Joshua Irvin at Cyprus High School. He
described the person as being tall. . . . He
said that person was between five foot, nine
and five foot, ten with long blonde hair.
He said he lived in the Magna or West Valley
Area. He indicated that he - the person does
crystal methamphetamine. . . . He said that

Defendant, Kenneth Ellis, and a store clerk all testified
that defendant and Ellis bought two quarts of beer at the Circle
K, which would account for the lack of one dollar bills found on
defendant after the search (R. 140, p. 114; R. 145, p. 146; R.
157, p. 215).
4

he had actually seen him around it, saw him
do it but it has been within the last two
years. He hasn't seen him recently. But he
knows friends of his who knows [sic] Mr.
Irvin much better than Mr. Meek knows him.
Additionally, he indicates that one of his
friends is owed money for Mr. Irvin for
drugs.
(R. 165, p. 2-3). On the basis of this information, Ellis's
counsel requested a continuance.

The court denied the motion (R.

165, p. 4). Subsequently, the jury convicted defendant as
charged (R. 109-10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a continuance because defendant did not
demonstrate that he met the standard required for the grant of
such a motion.

First, he failed to carry his burden of showing

that the testimony of the absent witness was material because he
did not even establish that the victim was, in fact, the person
whom the absent witness claimed to know.

Second, he failed to

establish that the testimony would have been admissible pursuant
to rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

And third, the

record does not reveal any indication that defendant used due
diligence to seek out any other witnesses who could have
corroborated defendant's version of the relevant events.

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE BECAUSE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO CARRY HIS
BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF THE ABSENT WITNESS WAS
BOTH MATERIAL AND ADMISSIBLE AND
THAT COUNSEL HAD EXERCISED DUE
DILIGENCE IN PREPARING THE CASE
BEFORE REQUESTING THE CONTINUANCE
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for a continuance of his trial (Br. of App.
at 10). He argues that he met the three-prong test for a
continuance and that the trial court's refusal to grant his
motion prejudiced him by preventing him from eliciting testimony
that "may have led to impeachment of Irvin's accusations that the
defendant took the money from Irvin's pocket and [Irvin's] claim,
that he did not use marijuana'' (Br. of App. at 6) .
A. Waiver
At the outset, one fact requires clarification.
defendant did not move for a continuance at trial.

Counsel for

Only his co-

defendant, Ellis, did so (R. 165, p.2 or addendum A ) .

Under

these circumstances, it is questionable whether defendant ever
preserved this issue for appellate review.

Cf. Lonao v. State,

580 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. App. 1991) (failure of defendant to
either object himself or join in codefendant's objection waives
review of issue on appeal); Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d
627, 629 (Ky. 1989) (where objecting attorney did not make clear
6

that objection was made on behalf of both codefendants and where
other attorney did not join in the objection, the issue is not
preserved with respect to the non-objecting defendant); People v.
Brown, 110 Cal.App.3d 24, 35 (Cal.Ct.App. 1980) (on appeal,
defendant cannot take advantage of objections made by codefendant
in absence of stipulation or understanding to that effect).
Here, defendant did not join in Ellis's motion.

The only

indication that defendant intended to do so was his ambiguous
statement, following Ellis's counsel's explanation of what she
had learned from Meek, that "I don't have anything to add, your
honor" (R. 165, p. 4) . This statement could reasonably be
interpreted to mean either that defendant intended to join in the
motion or that he had no articulable interest in it at all. Cf.
State v. Dahlaren. 512 A.2d 906, 913 n.9 (Conn. 1986)(where
codefendant alerted trial court in a timely fashion to
possibility of error, failure of defendant to fully challenge
ruling will not be dispositive).
Furthermore, defendant and Ellis appeared to have
incompatible interests.

While Ellis was represented by a court-

appointed attorney from the Legal Defender Association,
defendant's court-appointed LDA attorney had withdrawn because of
an unspecified conflict of interest, leaving defendant
represented by conflict counsel (R. 34-35).

Where interests of

co-defendants vary, it is neither logical nor ethically proper

7

for defendant to rely on a codefendant's pretrial motions.

State

v, Marahrens. 560 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Ariz. 1977).
B.

On the Merits

In any event, the law is well-settled that a decision to
grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of that discretion.
750, 752 (Utah 1982).

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d

It is equally well-settled that the burden

is on the moving party to demonstrate that the requirements for
granting a continuance have been met.
708, 714 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Horton, 848 P.2d

Thus, when a defendant moves for a

continuance to procure the testimony of an absent witness,
defendant assumes the burden of demonstrating three requirements:
"that the testimony is material and admissible, that the witness
could actually be procured within a reasonable time, and that due
diligence had been exercised before making the request."

State

v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citing State v.
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752); accord State v. Horton, 848 P.2d at
714.
In this case, even assuming arguendo that the objection of
Ellis's counsel preserved the issue as to defendant, defendant
has failed to demonstrate that the absent witness's testimony was
either material to the issue of guilt or admissible under rule
608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

8

He has further failed to

establish that his counsel used due diligence in attempting to
locate other witnesses to corroborate his account.
1. Defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating
that the absent witness's testimony was both admissible and
material.
Defendant argues that the testimony of the absent witness,
Brian Meek, was material because it could impeach Joshua Irvin's
testimony that he was not a drug user and that he did not
approach defendant for the purpose of buying drugs (Br. of App.
at 8, 9). In addition, defendant asserts, the testimony could
have corroborated defendant's testimony that Irvin approached him
to buy drugs (Br. of App. at 8). 3
Defendant's claim of materiality fails at the outset because
of its speculative nature.

Indeed, defendant has not even

established that the victim in this case was, in fact, the same
individual whom Brian Meek claimed to know.

Establishing

materiality through a positive identification would have been a
simple matter.

At the very least, counsel could have requested

permission to reopen the defense case and could have recalled
Joshua Irvin to the stand to ask him whether he attended Cyprus

In his testimony, defendant had asserted that Joshua
Irvin approached him near Crossroads Mall for the purpose of
purchasing drugs. To that end, according to defendant, Irvin
gave him ten dollars. With Irvin trailing behind, the pair then
walked north for several blocks. Along the way, Irvin became
angry and afraid that defendant intended to "rip him off." Irvin
finally ran off, saying, "I'm going to get you niggers" (R. 145,
p. 142-46).
9

High School, as Brian Meek contended.

The answer to that

question alone would have helped determine whether there was a
true factual nexus between Meek and Irvin.

Alternatively, since

Brian Meek was housed at the county jail, defense counsel could
have requested a short recess so that Meek could be called to the
stand to identify Joshua Irvin.4

In either event, the trial

court would have been afforded the opportunity to determine the
fundamental materiality of Meek's testimony.5
Not only has defendant failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating the materiality of Brian Meek's testimony, but he
has also failed to demonstrate why such testimony would be
admissible.

Of relevance to this case, rule 608(b), Utah Rules

of Evidence, provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking . . .
the witness' credibility,. . . may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character

4

The State agrees with defendant that the second prong of
the continuance standard has been met. That is, the absent
witness could plainly be produced within a reasonable amount of
time. See, e.g., State v. Horton, 848 P.2d at 714.
5

For the same reason, any claim of prejudicial error must
fail. Absent a demonstrated factual nexus between Meek and
Irvin, defendant has failed to carry his burden of showing that
he "was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of the
continuance or that the-trial result would have been different
had the continuance been granted." State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d
474, 476 (Utah App. 1991).
10

for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . .
According to defense counsel's proffer, Meek was going to
testify about specific instances during which he had seen Joshua
Irvin use crystal methamphetamine (R. 165).6

However, rule

608(b) makes clear that this testimony would not have been
admissible to impeach Irvin's statements that he did not use
illicit drugs and to otherwise attack Irvin's credibility.7
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702 (Utah App. 1993), plainly
supports this interpretation of the law as applied to these
facts.

The defendant in Martinez, after engaging in several drug

transactions with undercover agents, was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance.

At trial, undercover

agent Anne Burchett testified that she misled defendant into
believing that she was a drug user while, in fact, she was not.

6

In addition, Meeks was going to testify that Irvin owed
one of his friends money for drugs (R. 165). This testimony
would be inadmissible hearsay under rules 801(c) and 802, Utah
Rules of Evidence. Defendant's suggestion that these statements
"would not be excluded under the hearsay rule because both Irvin
and the witness [Meeks] can be cross-examined on the testimony"
is erroneous. See Appellant's Br. at 8-9. Defendant has ignored
the fact that the declarant - the unnamed friend to whom Irvin
allegedly owed money - did not testify. Hearsay evidence is
inadmissible unless it falls under one of the enumerated
exceptions listed in rule 803, none of which apply here.
7

According to the rule, the proper way for defendant to
have impeached Irvin's credibility would have been to question
him on cross-examination about the specific instances recounted
by Meek during which Irvin allegedly used crystal
methamphetamine.
11

Id. at 704.

Defense counsel then proffered that his witness,

Steve Farr, would testify that "he knew Burchett during the time
she was working the Martinez case, that the two of them used
cocaine and marijuana together, and that he observed Burchett *to
be under the influence of drugs in a manner that was impossible
and inconsistent with her having only simulated the use of
drugs.'"
608(b).

Id.
Id.

The trial court excluded this testimony under rule
This Court affirmed, stating that "Farr's testimony

would have been extrinsic evidence of specific instances of
Burchett's conduct for the purpose of attacking her credibility,
which is exactly what Rule 608(b) was designed to exclude."

Id.

Just as in Martinez, Brian Meek's testimony in this case
would have been inadmissible extrinsic evidence of specific
instances of Irvin's conduct, offered for the explicit purpose of
attacking Irvin's credibility.8

"Where the content of the

prospective witness' testimony is . . . likely to be
inadmissible, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a
continuance."

Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (citation omitted).

Here, where the testimony of Brian Meeks was likely to be
inadmissible under rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and

8

Furthermore, the testimony had no purpose other than
impeachment. Establishing that Irvin was a drug user Would not
demonstrate that defendant did not commit the crime. "It is not
an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for continuance when the
testimony sought is only for impeachment purposes" and does not
serve to exonerate the defendant. Creviston, 64 6 P.2d at 753
(citations omitted).
12

was immaterial as well, the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance,
2. Defendant has made no showing that he used due diligence
in investigating defendant's account of the events.
Defendant has also failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating that he exercised due diligence before requesting a
continuance.

He argues "it was unlikely that this

witness

would

have been discovered prior to trial no matter how much due
diligence the parties' [sic] exercised" (Br. of App. at
9)(emphasis added).

While defense counsel may have been unable

to uncover this particular witness prior to trial even if due
diligence was used, it is unclear whether defense counsel
exercised due diligence to investigate any potential witnesses
who might have corroborated defendant's story that Joshua Irvin
was a drug user.
Because defendant has failed to provide this Court with an
adequate record from which to determine that his counsel
exercised due diligence, this Court should presume the regularity
of the proceedings below, affirming the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for a continuance.

See State v. Blubaugh, 904

P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (an appellate court will "assume
the regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to
provide an adequate record on appeal") (citation omitted), cert,
denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Wulffenstein,
657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (an appellant has "the duty and
13

responsibility of supporting [his] allegation by an adequate
record" and, absent such record, his "assignment of error stands
as a unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to
determine").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
second degree felony conviction for theft from a person.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q_

day of December, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

C .^W^C_
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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1 bit more further. He said that person was between
2 five foot, nine and five foot, ten with long blonde
3 hair. He said he lived in the Magna or West Valley
4 Area. He indicated that he - the person does
5 crystal methamphetamine. I pressed him on that He
6 said that he had actually seen him around it, saw him
7 do it but it has been within the last two years. He
8 hasn't seen him recently. But he knows friends of
9 his who knows Mr. Irvin much better than Mr. Meek
10 knows him. Additionally, he indicates that one of
11 his friends is owed money for Mr. Irvin for drugs.
12
And at this time we would be asking the
13 Court to continue this. Although we have rested,
14 this is new information that may be important to the
15 case; the reason being is Mr. Irvin indicated that he
16 doesn't use drugs in his testimony. He also
17 indicated that — there was a statement at the
18 preliminary hearing where he - his usual practice is
19 not to buy drugs from strangers, which if we were to
20 find the person who he owes money to for drugs and he
21 actually went to school together and were friends
22 together, that would impeach that statement that 23 he didn't say that he meant that for face value, that
24 he meant it sarcastically. And we'd be asking the
25 Court to give us some time to investigate this

Page 4

Page 2

1

PROCEEDINGS

2
THE COURT: Miss Clark, you wanted the
3 convenience of the record?
4
MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor. This
5 morning at approximately 10:301 received a note from
6 Mr. Ellis indicating that a person by the name of
7 Brian Meek, who is an inmate at the jail - he was
8 housed in l-B-3 at the time this information was
9 brought up and now is in Section 7-B - is — was
10 arrested for no insurance, no registration and no
11 seat belt He overheard some other people in the
12 jail speaking about the victim in this case, or the
13 alleged victim in this case, Joshua Irvin. Mr. Meeks
14 spoke up and said he knew Mr. Irvin and that he had
15 seen him in the past being around crystal
16 methamphetamine and also using crystal
17 methamphetamine.
18
I received that information, I notified
19 the Court, the Court instructed that I go speak to
20 Mr. Meek. I took my investigator, Patty - 1 forgot
21 - Rodman is her last name, and we both went and
22 spoke with Mr. Meek. He indicated to me that he went
23 to a school with someone by the name of Joshua Irvin
24 at Cyprus High School. He described the person as
25 being tall. I asked him to describe that a little

CARLTON WAY, CSR 801-535-5464

1 better. And, you know, with this just short notice,
2 we haven't done anything, but I did speak to this
3 Mr. Meek.
THE COURT: Mr. Freestone?
4
MR. FREESTONE: I don't have anything to
5
6 add, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The request for continuance
7
8 is denied.
(End supplemental.)
9
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